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Financing Strategies of the R&D Firm
Lawrence Fogelberg
Troy State University
John M. Griffith
Old Dominion University
This paper investigates the fl nanci ng strategies of the R &D fl rm. Ort r hypotheses are based on Cho 's (/992) game theory model where the firm develops a
product but needs additional financing to bring it to market. The model generates a particularly rich set of hypotheses: I) to fund the completion of its
project and bring its product to market, the firm initiates negotiations with an
established firm; 2) the majority of the acquisitions will be partial cash acquisitions through private secondary offerings. Confirming the model ·s
hypotheses, we find that the majority of the acquisitions are partial cash acquisitions by significantly larger established R&D firms.

Introduction
This paper examines how research and development (R&D) rich but cash poor
firms finance continued growth. We find that most acquisitions are seller-initiated
partial cash acquisitions of the seller through a private secondary offering. Cho's
(1992) game theory model is the foundation for our hypotheses. The empirical
results confirm our hypotheses: the effect upon the combined wealth of acquirer and
seller will be positive; the acquiring firm is an established firm and experiences
positive abnormal returns; cash is the primary means of payment; and if the acquisition is terminated, who terminates the acquisition has a significant influence upon the
returns of the acquirer and seller.
In Cho's (1992) model, the firm embarks upon a major project with only partial
funding in hand; thus, it must raise additional capital upon reaching a critical point in
its research. The market has a good estimate of the firm's assets in place, but does
not have a good estimate of the value of the firm's option to develop the new product. Furthermore, because of competitive factors, the firm has a limited period in
which to exercise this option and to bring its product to market.
To raise capital, the firm must either attempt a public secondary equity offering,
a private secondary equity offering, or return to its original investors. Because of
adverse selection problems, a public secondary equity offering may not be possible,
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particularly if the firm is of the type whose shares would otherwise be offered under
a best efforts form of investment banking contract. Myers and Majluf (1984) show
that the market interprets a public secondary equity offering as a negative signal,
therefore making a successful public secondary best efforts offering highly unlikely.
The original investors or founders are likely to have used all of their capital to fund
the original research. Thus, a private secondary offering of the firm to an established
company may be the best means of raising the needed capital.
Grinblatt and Titman ( I 998, p. 677) provide a motivating example of the type of
acquisition we address in this study. In their example, a selling firm with significant
information asymmetries is reluctant to undertake a public secondary equity offering
and seeks a strategic acquisition by a cash rich firm in order to finance a major project. Because we are focusing upon firms with high R&D expenditures, Grinblatt and
Titman's reasoning is taken one step further. We posit that the selling firm seeks an
acquiring firm that is both cash rich and that is capable of evaluating the state of the
selling firm's technology and the true value of the selling firm's real option. It has
been established in a number of studies, including Akerlof ( 1970), that the cost of
information asymmetry is always borne by the seller. Therefore, it is in the best
interest of the seller to seek the acquiring firm best capable of evaluating the
technology in question. By doing so, the seller can minimize the discount at which it
must sell its shares. Completing the scenario, the selling firm exists in a vigorously
competitive market in which its technology is subject to rapid obsolescence; thus, the
selling firm has what amounts to an expiring real option, which it must sell before its
expiration date.

Hypotheses
Our hypotheses (Table 1) are based on Cho's (1992) model, which has been
applied to best efforts offerings with risk of failure, and applies the sequential equilibrium concept with the intuitive refinement of Cho and Kreps (1987).
Table 1-Hypotheses
I. The majority of acquisitions will be partial acquisitions
2 . The acquiring finn will be an established technology finn
3. Means of payment for these partial acquisitions will be cash
4 There is a combined positive shareholder wealth effect when the selling finn and acquiring finn
are combined
5. The acquiring finn experiences significant and positive abnonnal returns due to its bargain purchase of the seller
6. Tennination of negotiations by the selling finn operates as a signal that the offer price was insufficient and that the seller anticipates a bener offer elsewhere. In this case, the p1ice of the seller' s
shares should remain above the ptice that existed before the beginning of the negotiations
7. Tennination of the acquisition by the acquiring finn provides a signal that the shares of the seller
are overvalued. In this case, prices should fall below the price that existed before the beginning of
the negotiation
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In developing our hypotheses, the following assumptions are made. The R&D
firm embarks upon a major research project with only partial funding in hand, as it
would be too risky for investment bankers or venture capitalists to fund the full project from the outset or the founders have only enough capital to fund their research.
Thus, it must raise additional capital upon reaching a critical point in its research.
The market has a good estimate of the R&D firm's assets in place, but does not have
a good estimate of the value of the firm's option to develop and market the new
technology. Furthermore, because of competitive factors, the firm has a limited
period in which to exercise this option and to bring this technology to market.
To raise the needed capital, the R&D firm must either attempt a public secondary equity offering, a partial sale of the firm through a private secondary offering to
an established technology company, or return to its original investors. Because of
adverse selection problems (Myers and Majluf, 1984) a public secondary equity
offering may not be possible, particularly if the R&D firm is of the type whose
shares would otherwise be offered under a best efforts form of investment banking
contract. Returning to the founders is possible, but unlikely, because they have used
all of their resources to fund the original research and venture capitalists are not
likely to risk further capital because the technology is so advanced that only a handful of professionals is qualified to evaluate the quality of the research at that point.
Thus, for reasons of information asymmetry, the best alternative is to submit the partial results of their research to the scrutiny of a cash-rich technology firm and sell a
portion of the firm through a private secondary offering. A partial acquisition by an
established technology company may be the best and only means of raising capital.
Additionally, we assume the selling R&D firm has inside information regarding
the value of its option. We assume that all players are risk neutral, but that there is
some probability that the acquiring R&D firm will observe the value of the option
prior to the end of negotiations. If the acquiring firm observes the value of the option
and sees that the seller is overpriced, it ends the negotiations; the option expires
worthless.
The model provides the following hypotheses. First, in order to minimize the
adverse selection problem, the selling R&D firm will negotiate with a single
acquirer. If the terms of the proposed acquisition are unfavorable, the seller may end
negotiations and seek another potential acquirer. The seller will only deal with one
potential acquirer at a time. Second, a withdrawal from negotiations on the part of
the acquirer would represent a strong negative signal to other potential acquirers;
thus, it would be virtually impossible for the seller to arrange another acquisition
before the expiration of its real option.
The optimal strategy for both parties is for the selling firm to continue as a separately traded firm. Allowing the target firm to continue to sell its shares in the public
market allows optimal contracting between the acquiring firm and the selling firm,
because it allows for incentive-based compensation for the employees of the target.
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With shares that trade independently in the public markets, the target can retain key
employees and the acquiring firm can minimize overall compensation costs. Hence,
our third hypothesis is that the majority of these acquisitions will be partial acquisitions rather than total acquisitions. Furthermore, we foresee that because firms are
looking for cash so they can bring their R&D work to fruition, the means of payment
for these partial acquisitions will be cash.
As in Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), we expect there will be a combined positive shareholder wealth effect when the selling firm and acquiring firm are
combined. For the seller, this positive response results from the fact that the seller is
assured of funding for the completion of its R&D project. Some underpricing is
involved, but the seller is better off selling a portion of its shares at a discounted
price than it would have been if it had lost the opportunity to complete its R&D project. Contrary to Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), we forecast significant and positive
abnormal returns to the acquiring firm. The gains are the result of the acquirer's bargain purchase of an interest in the seller. When combined, the selling and acquiring
firms show a positive shareholder wealth effect due to the fact that a project with a
positive net present value (NPV) will be completed and the wealth gain from the
positive NPV R&D project will be shared between the selling and the acquiring firm.
Franks, Harris, and Mayer (1987) and Travlos (1987) show that the means of
payment will have a significant effect upon the abnormal returns of the acquiring
firm shares. Eckbo, Giammarino, and Heinke! (1990) find that payment by means of
shares operates as a signal that there is more uncertainty concerning the quality of
the selling firm's technology. Our model predicts, because the seller must complete a
promising R&D project, that the seller will only accept cash as the means of payment. Furthermore, we predict a stock for stock transaction signals that the
motivation behind the acquisition is something other than the need for cash to complete a favorable R&D project. Hence, we predict positive returns for both the
acquiring and acquired firm, given that we anticipate that the means of payment will
be cash.
Finally, our model provides us with a specific hypothesis concerning the
termination of the negotiations. In Bradley ( 1980), Dodd ( 1980), and Bradley, Desai,
and Kim (1983), the price of the seller upon the failure of the negotiations stayed
higher than existed prior to the beginning of negotiations. They argue that if no
information is conveyed by the negotiations, the price should return to its original
level after a failed acquisition. In our model, termination of negotiations by the selling firm operates as a signal that the offer price is insufficient and the seller
anticipates a better offer elsewhere. In this case, the price of the seller's shares
should remain above the price that existed before the beginning of the negotiations.
On the other hand, termination by the acquiring firm provides a signal that the
shares of the seller are overvalued. In this case, prices should fall below the price that
existed before the beginning of the negotiations. Thus, the termination of negotia-
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tions by the acquiring firm should have a catastrophic effect upon the market price of
the seller's shares.

Data and Methodology
A list of 953 acquisitions was obtained from Securities Data Corporation.
Securities Data Corporation defines an R&D acquisition as one when either the seller
or acquirer is from specific SIC codes that are R&D intensive. The data set used in
the study spans 1996 through 2000 and consists of 391 matched pairs of R&D
acquirers and sellers that have return data available on the Center for Research of
Security Prices' (CRSP) tapes for both participants and have financial data available
on COMPUST AT. The history of each contest was found by examining the Wall
Street Journal Index, the Dow Jones News Wire, or the Lexis/Nexis Business News
Service.
The sellers are significantly smaller than acquirers and primarily trade over the
counter (Table 2). The set of acquirers (391) consists of 226 exchange-listed firms
and 165 over-the-counter traded firms. The market value of equity of the R&D
acquirers ranges from $526 million to $269.8 billion, with a median market value of
$5.8 billion. R&D acquirers on average spent 36.6 percent of revenue on R&D. The
median R&D acquirer applied 10.8 percent ofrevenue into R&D.
Table 2-Sample Description of R&D Acquirers and Sellers for the 1996-2000 Period
Acquirers
Sellers
Total
391
391
Exchange Listed
226
63
NASDAQ
165
328
Market Value of Equity:
Range
$526 million-$269.8 billion $35 million-$71.9 billion
Mean
$26. 7 billion
S2.3 billion
Median
$5.8 billion
$141 million
Percent Acquired
Mean
Median
Percent of Revenue Spent on R&D
Mean
36.6%
1,308%
Median
10.8%
127%
Successful Acquirers
333
Withdrew or Defeated
58
Partial Acquisitions
330
Partial Cash Acquisition
310
Friendly Acquisition
319

In comparison, the set ofR&D selling firms (391) comprises 63 exchange-listed
firms and 328 firms that trade over the counter. The R&D sellers' market value of
equity ranges from $35 million to $71.9 billion, with a median market value of$ 141
million. They, on average, spent 1,308 percent of revenue on R&D. The median
R&D seller invested 127 percent ofrevenue into R&D.
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The event study methodology used to calculate the cumulative abnormal returns
(CARs) from the CRSP daily return files is the standard event study methodology
presented by Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll ( 1969). For each security i, an abnormal
return (AR) for each event day tis calculated using the single-index market model:
AR;1 = R;1 -(a;+ p;Rm1)

(I)

where R;1 is the rate of return on security i for event day t and Rm 1is the rate of return
on the CRSP value-weighted index on event day t. a; and p; are the ordinary least
squares estimates of the intercept and slope of the market model regression, respectively. A value-weighted index is used because theoretically it most appropriately
reflects total market performance (Roll, 198 I). The estimation period for the market
model regression relative to the event date, t = 0, is from t = -210 to t = -11. This
period is chosen to estimate the market model to avoid contaminating the regression
(Brown and Warner, 1985). The CARs are accumulated over three periods depending on the hypothesis being tested. First, from day t = -5; to event day t = +5;, with
t = 0 being the first date on which the acquisition was announced in the Wall Street
Journal, the Dow Jones News Wire, or the Lexis/Nexis Business News Service.
Next, for the entire contest period, from the announcement of the acquisition until
the acquirer completes the acquisition or the acquisition is terminated, and from day
t = -5; to event day t = +5; with t = 0 being the date the acquirer completes the acquisition or the termination of the acquisition.
We use Dennis and McConnell's (1986) methodology to obtain a measure of
dollar returns. The examination of dollar returns is important due to the possible size
differential between the acquirer and seller in the typical acquisition (Jensen and
Ruback, 1983 ). Roll (1986) observes that if the acquirer is substantially larger than
the acquired, then the price increase of the acquired would correspond to such a
small change in price to the acquirer that the change in market value would be hidden in the bid/ask spread and in the noise of daily return volatility. We ascertain the
dollar amounts of abnormal returns in terms of n day market-adjusted cumulative
abnormal returns.
$CAR= n-day CAR* Price on day ( t - 6) * number of shares

(2)

where CAR is the cumulative abnormal gain and t = -6 is the day before the event
window. $CAR is the abnormal dollar gain during the announcement period.
Aggregate dollar synergies are computed by summing the selling and buying
firms' dollar gains involved in successful acquisitions. We exclude the gains on
seller's shares already held by the acquirer from the dollar synergy computation.
$SYNERGY = $BCAR + $SCAR x ( 1- HELD)

(3)
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$BCAR and $SCAR represent the abnormal dollar gains to the buying and selling
firm's shares, respectively, during the announcement period. HELD is the proportion
of seller's common stock held by the acquirer prior to the announcement.

Evidence
Strongly supporting our first hypothesis that a majority of the acquisitions will
be partial acquisitions (Table 2), 330 of the 333 (99 percent) successful R&D acquirers made only a partial acquisition of the seller. Three hundred thirty-three R&D
acquisitions were consummated, while 58 were not completed. Further supporting
this hypothesis, we find that 83 percent of all acquisitions were partial acquisitions.
Table 3-Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs)
The CARs are accumulated over the various periods depending on the hypothesis being tested.
Announcement is defined as from day t = -5, to event day t = +5,, with t = 0 being the first date on which
the acquisition is announced and from day t = -5, to event day t = +5; with t = 0 being the date the acquirer
completes the acquisition or announces its tennination of the acquisition in the Wall Street Journal, the
Dow Jones News Wire, or the Lexis/Nexis Business News Service. Window is defined as the entire contest period, from the announcement of the acquisition until the acquirer completes the acquisition or
announces its tennination
Acquirers
Sellers
Announcement:
All (391)
17.61%***
1.62%**
Partial Acquisition (330)
11.70%***
1.53%**
Total Acquisition (61)
2.04%***
21.54%***
Cash (311)
18.67%***
0.93%
Stock (80)
2,81%***
16.58%***
Tennination by Acquirer (29)
-13.44%***
-1.61%**
Tennination by Seller (29)
-3.02%***
7.10%*
Window:
All Completed (333)
1.40**
11.26%***
Partial Acquisition (290)
5.71%**
0.76
Total Acquisition (43)
1.58**
20.25%***
Cash (311)
0.99**
9.57%***
Stock (80)
12.54%***
0.81
Tennination by Acquirer (29)
-0.34
-22.90%***
Tennination by Seller (29)
23.78%***
-3.76***
*, **, ***denotes statistical significance at the IO percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively

We find that in 842 of953 acquisitions (86 percent) both the seller and the buyer
are R&D firms, thus confirming our hypothesis that the majority of the acquisitions
would be between technology firms.
Supporting the hypothesis that most of the partial acquisitions would be cash
acquisitions, we find the method of payment is cash for 310 of the 330 partial acquisitions. Furthermore, 319 of 333 (96 percent) completed acquisitions are friendly,
leading us to conclude that the seller, rather than the acquirer, initiates most acquisitions.
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Next, affirming the hypothesis of positive synergies, we find the average combined wealth effect of the 391 matched pairs is a positive $524.33 million for all
acquisitions. Supporting the hypothesis that the acquiring firm's shareholders will
experience significant positive abnormal returns, all acquirers on average earned a
significant 1.62 percent abnormal return. Those that made only a partial acquisition
experienced a significant 1.53 percent abnormal return. Sellers on average earned a
significant 17.61 percent upon the announcement of their pending acquisition. Furthermore, those firms who sold a minority stake in the firm experienced a significant
increase in value of 11. 70 percent upon the announcement of the proposed sale.
Franks, Harris, and Mayer ( 1989), Travlos ( 1987), and Eckbo, Giammarino, and
Heinke! (1990), find that the means of payment will have a significant effect upon
abnormal returns; we observe that those acquirers that paid cash earned a positive but
insignificant 0.93 percent and those acquirers that paid for the acquisition in stock
earned a significant 2.81 percent. Shareholders of sellers that were bought with cash
earned a significant abnormal return of 18.67 percent, whereas shareholders of sellers that were paid for through a stock swap earned a significantly less 16.58 percent.
Last, as predicted, the termination of negotiations by the acquiring firm does
have a catastrophic effect upon the market price of the seller's shares. Upon the
announcement that the acquirer has terminated the negotiations, the average seller
experiences a significant loss of 13.44 percent, and the average acquirer returns all
and then some of the increase in shareholder wealth that occurred when the acquirer
announced its intended acquisition, a significant loss of 1.61 percent. When the
entire negotiation period is considered, sellers suffer a significant loss of 22.90
percent and acquirers lose an insignificant 0.34 percent.
Alternatively, when the seller terminates the sale it earns a significant abnormal
increase in value of 23.78 percent over the contest period, whereas the average
acquirer loses a significant 3.76 percent. This evidence suggests these finding are
due to the replacement of one acquirer with another.

Conclusion
We examine the strategies of R&D firms that have developed a prototype
technology but need financing in order to bring their ideas to market. It is assumed
that the market has a good estimate of the R&D firm's assets in place, but does not
have a good estimate of the value of the firm's option to develop the new technology. Furthermore, it is assumed because of competitive factors that the R&D firm
has a limited period of time in which to exercise this option and to bring this technology to market. The model leads to six hypotheses: 1) the majority of these
acquisitions will be partial acquisitions; 2) the acquiring firm will be an established
technology company; 3) the combined wealth effect of the acquirer and acquired will
be positive; 4) the acquiring firm will experience positive abnormal returns; 5) the
means of payment will be cash; and 6) who terminates the acquisition will have a
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dramatic impact upon the returns of the acquirer and the seller. The empirical results
validate the hypotheses. It is discovered that most acquirers only make a partial
acquisition of the seller, acquiring firms are established technology companies, and
the seller initiates the acquisition. The evidence supports the hypothesis that the
combined wealth effect of acquirer and seller will be positive and the hypothesis that
the acquiring firm will experience positive abnormal returns. Furthermore, we find
that the means of payment is generally cash. Who terminates the acquisition has a
significant influence upon the returns of the acquirer and seller.
We conclude from the study's results that these acquisitions are beneficial to the
stockholders of both parties and to society as a whole. The stockholders of both
benefit from the increase in their wealth. Society benefits from the acquisitions
because they allow for the furtherance of R&D activity that might otherwise be
abandoned due to a lack of capital.
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